We consider the problem of distributed load balancing in heterogenous parallel server systems, where the service rate achieved by a user at a server depends on both the user and the server. Such heterogeneity typically arises in wireless networks (e.g., servers may represent frequency bands, and the service rate of a user varies across bands). Users select servers in a distributed manner. They initially attach to an arbitrary server. However, at random instants of time, they may probe the load at a new server and migrate there to improve their service rate. We analyze the system dynamics under the natural Random Local Search (RLS) migration scheme, introduced in [5]. Under this scheme, when a user has the opportunity to switch servers, she does it only if this improves her service rate. The dynamics under RLS may be interpreted as those generated by strategic players updating their strategy in a load balancing game. We show that this game has pure Nash Equilibriums (NEs), and we analyze their efficiency. We further prove that when the user population grows large, pure NEs get closer to a Proportionally Fair (PF) allocation of users to servers, and we characterize the gap between equilibriums and this ideal allocation depending on user population. Under the RLS algorithm, the system converges to pure NEs: we study the time it takes for the system to reach the PF allocation within a certain margin.
I. INTRODUCTION
Load balancing is an essential component in computer systems; it ensures high resource utilization and guarantees satisfactory quality of service. Traditionally, load balancing is performed when tasks arrive in the system: a task is assigned to a carefully selected server, and stays there until service completion. In this paper, we investigate systems where tasks are initially assigned to servers at random, but may be reassigned to other servers during their services. An additional important property of the systems considered here lies in their heterogeneity: the service speed of a task at a given server depends on both the task and the server.
Our work is motivated by two important problems in radio communication networks. (1) Dynamic Spectrum Access. Transmitters are today able to exploit a large part of the radio spectrum, and can switch frequency bands rapidly. The service rate achieved on a link operating on a given frequency band depends on the load of this band (i.e., the number of competing links exploiting on the same band), and on the channel conditions which in turn depend on the band and the link (this phenomenon is known as frequency selective fading). When joining the system, transmitters are not aware of the load of each frequency band, and they select a band randomly. However they may explore new bands, and migrate there if this improves their throughput. The overall system performance then strongly relies on the distributed resampling and switching strategy. (2) Access Point Selection. When users in a wireless network may attach to various access points, we get a similar situation. The throughput experienced by a user depends on the load of the selected access point, and on the geographical proximity of this access point. Again when users start transmitting, they randomly select an access point, but they may later switch access points. In both examples, the network can be modelled as an heterogenous parallel server system: servers correspond to either frequency bands or access points, and the heterogeneity stems from frequency selective fading or from the heterogenous channel conditions to the various access points.
In this paper, we consider a generic heterogenous system of parallel servers fairly sharing their resources in time among users (they implement a Processor Sharing discipline). Users initially pick a server randomly, and may later switch servers during their services. For such systems, we aim at identifying efficient and fair distributed resampling algorithms. We analyze the performance of the Random Local Search (RLS) algorithm introduced and studied in [5] in the specific case of homogenous systems (all users are served at the same speed at any server). Under RLS, a user resamples a server randomly selected at the instants of a Poisson process, and moves there if this improves her service rate. RLS is evaluated in closed systems, where the user population is fixed. We compare the performance of RLS to that obtained under an ideal Proportionally Fair (PF) allocation of users to servers. We also study the rate at which RLS converges.
In [5] , the performance of the RLS algorithm is investigated in the case of homogenous systems: all servers offer the same service rate to all users. The analysis of the latter systems is much simpler. Indeed in such systems, allocations where each server roughly handles the same number of users are efficient, and they are easy to identify and reach. In heterogenous systems, characterizing and finding efficient allocations turns out to be much more challenging, as users have individual preferences for servers.
Under RLS, the system dynamics correspond to those in an ordinal potential game where players (here users) sequentially and selfishly update their strategy (the selected server). Hence under RLS, the system converges to pure Nash Equilibriums (NEs). • We study the efficiency of these NEs. We prove that when the user population grows large, pure NEs get closer to a Proportionally Fair (PF) allocation of users to servers. • We provide an upper bound of the gap between the welfares of NEs and of the ideal PF allocation depending on user population. This gap scales at most as S n log(n + S) where n and S denote the number of users and servers, respectively. • We further study the time it takes, under RLS, for the system to reach the PF allocation within a certain margin. More precisely, when the user population is large enough, after a time S log(S) , the expected system welfare under RLS is at a distance at most of the welfare of the PF allocation.
II. RELATED WORK
Distributed load resampling strategies can be analyzed using game theoretical techniques, and there have been many studies in the analysis of load balancing games, see [11] for a survey. Most of the analysis aim at characterizing the inefficiency of NEs in these games, through the notion of price of anarchy [8] . Researchers have also looked at the time it takes to balance the system under various strategies, including bestresponse or Nash dynamics (such strategies require that users are aware of the load at all servers) [12] , and more distributed strategies, see [3] and references therein. Please also refer to [5] for a more detailed discussion. As far as we know, all existing results concern homogenous systems. In heterogenous systems, the underlying games are more involved, as they do not belong to the class of potential games [1] , [2] , [4] , [9] . This significantly complicates the analysis of the efficiency of NEs, and very little is known about the time it takes to reach these NEs. Our approach to study such games departs from existing techniques. The use of the ideal and pivotal PF allocation to analyze NEs is novel.
III. MODELS
We consider a set S of S servers shared by n users. The latter are categorized into a set K of K classes. Users of class k may access to a subset S k ⊂ S of servers. We denote by K s the set of classes whose users may be served by server s. At a given time t, the state of the system is represented by a vector n(t) describing the numbers of users of the different classes attached to the various servers. When the system state is n = (n ks ) k∈K,s∈S ∈ N K×S , n ks denotes the number of class-k users attached to server s. Note that n ks = 0 if s / ∈ S k . For s ∈ S, we further denote by n s = k∈K n ks the number of users attached to server s, and for k ∈ K, n k = s∈S k n ks is the number of class-k users.
An alternative way of representing the system state is to use the user population n and the proportions of users of different classes and attached to the various servers, α = (α ks ) k∈K,s∈S ∈ ∆ K×S , where ∆ p is the simplex of dimension p, i.e., x ∈ ∆ p if i x i = 1 and for all i, x i ≥ 0. We write n ∼ (n, α) if n = k n k , and for all k, s, n ks = α ks n.
Each server fairly shares its capacity in time among users attached to it. We consider heterogenous systems: users are served at different speeds at different servers. Specifically, let µ ks be the service speed of a class-k user at server s. Hence, when the system is in state n, each class-k user attached to server s is served at rate µ ks /n s . We denote by µ min = min k∈K min s∈S k µ ks > 0 and by µ max = max k∈K max s∈S k µ ks the minimum and maximum speed at which users can be served, and define ξ = µ max /µ min .
A. Distributed Load Balancing Algorithms
Users have a myopic view of the system in the sense that they are aware of their current service rate, but they do not know the rate at which they would be served at other servers. We consider natural distributed load balancing strategies, where users independently resample and switch servers to selfishly improve their rates. The first proposed strategy, referred to as Random Local Search (RLS) algorithm, has been introduced in [5] , and analyzed in homogenous scenarios where users are served at the same speed when attached to the same server, namely for all s and all k ∈ K s , µ ks does not depend on k. We shall compare this first algorithms to the Best Response (BR) algorithm, under which when a user decides to switch server, she picks the one offering the best service rate.
• The RLS algorithm. At the instants of a Poisson process of intensity β, a user randomly selects a new server (if the user is of class k, this choice is uniform over S k ). Under RLS, she migrates to it if this would increase her service rate. Assume that the system is in state n, and that a classk user attached to server s considers switching servers. Let s be the randomly selected server. Under RLS, the user migrates to s if µ ks /(n s + 1) > µ ks /n s . • The BR algorithm. Each user switches servers at the instants of a Poisson process of intensity β. If the system is in state n, when the opportunity arises, a class-k user attached to server s migrates to s ∈ arg max c∈S k µ kc /(n c + 1 s =s ). Observe that to implement the BR algorithm, users need to know the service rates they would achieve at the various servers, which can be costly.
B. Objectives
We consider closed systems, where the numbers of users of the various classes are fixed. We are interested in the system dynamics under the RLS and BR algorithms. Let n [1−K] = (n 1 , . . . , n K ) represent the fixed population of users of the various classes, and let N (n [1−K] ) denote the set of feasible system states having n k class-k users for all k ∈ K:
To investigate the system state dynamics under the RLS and BR algorithms, we interpret n(t) as the set of strategies used at time t by the various players in a dynamic load balancing game. In this game, the set of pure strategies available to a class-k user or player is just the set of servers S k , and her payoff corresponds to her service rate. In what follows, we study the existence and efficiency of pure Nash Equilibriums in this load balancing game, and characterize the speed at which n(t) converges to these equilibriums under the RLS and BR algorithms.
IV. EQUILIBRIA AND DYNAMICS
The numbers of users of various classes are fixed and represented by a vector n [1−K] = (n 1 , . . . , n K ) where n k is the number of class-k users. For all t ≥ 0, n(t) ∈ N (n [1−K] ). The initial allocation of users to servers n(0) is arbitrary.
As mentioned previously, we may interpret the evolution of n(t) under RLS and BR as the evolving strategies of players or users in a dynamic load balancing game. In this game, n ∈ N (n [1−K] ) constitutes a pure NE if and only if:
The above inequality states that in state n, a class-k user attached to server s has no incentive to move to server s . We show that pure NEs exist, and that under both RLS and BR, n(t) converges to a pure NE as t grows large. The existence of pure NEs is simply due to the fact that the game admits an ordinal potential function. We also study the efficiency of the pure NEs, and the rate at which n(t) converges to an equilibrium under the RLS and BR algorithms. We establish that for large user populations, the equilibriums are close to the proportionally fair allocation, and provide an upper bound of the distance to this ideal allocation depending on the numbers of users and servers. The analysis of the rate of convergence to equilibrium under RLS and BR turns out to be challenging. This is mainly due to the system heterogeneity. Recall that in [5] , this rate of convergence was studied for homogenous systems with servers of equal capacities, i.e., µ ks = 1 for all k and s, which significantly simplifies the analysis. To analyze RLS and BR in heterogenous systems, our idea is to track the evolution over time of the distance between n(t) and the ideal proportionally fair allocation. To this aim, we establish a relationship between the expected drifts in social welfare (defined with logarithmic utilities) and in the ordinal potential. In turn, this allows us to quantify the rate of convergence of the system state under the RLS and BR algorithms when the user population is typically large.
A. Ordinal Potential and Social Welfare 1) An ordinal potential game: In our load balancing game, the system state n determines the strategies played by all users (n ks is the number of class-k users playing or selecting server s). As shown in [6] , due to the system heterogeneity, the game does not belong to the class of potential games [10] . Indeed in general, one cannot find a set of increasing functions u k : R + → R, and a potential function ψ : N (n [1−K] ) → R such that: for any k ∈ K and any s, s ∈ S k , ψ(n + e ks − e ks ) − ψ(n) = u k ( µ ks n s +1 ) − u k ( µ ks n s ) for all n ∈ N (n [1−K] ). Here n + e ks − e ks denotes the system state obtained from n by moving one class-k user from server s to server s . In fact, our load balancing game is a congestion game with playerspecific utilities as introduced in [9] . It can be readily checked that there exists a function ψ : N (n [1−K] ) → R such that for all n ∈ N (n [1−K] ), for all k, s, s such that n ks > 0, µ ks n s < µ ks n s +1 ⇒ ψ(n) < ψ(n+e ks −e ks ). Such a function ψ is referred to an ordinal potential function. A possible ordinal potential function ψ is defined by: for all n ∈ N (n [ The existence of an ordinal potential function ensures that pure NEs exists, and that the system dynamics under the RLS and BR algorithms converge to a pure NE [13] .
2) Proportionally Fair allocation: When the user population is large, n is a pure NE if and only if: for all k, let s ∈ S k such that n ks > 0, then for any s ∈ S k , n ks > 0 iff µ ks n s = µ ks n s , and n ks = 0 iff µ ks n s < µ ks n s . These conditions actually coincide with the KKT conditions of the following convex program:
In what follows, we denote by x the solution of (1), and W = W (x ). The above observation suggests that when the number of users grows large, the pure NEs become efficient in the sense that the allocation of users to servers is proportionally fair [7] . In the following subsection, we formalize this observation more precisely.
Define the social welfare in state n ∈ N (n [1−K] ) as:
The proportionally fair allocation n maximizes W (n) over all n ∈ N (n [1−K] ). Note that typically, the social welfare scales as −n log(n) when n is large (the service of a user scales as 1/n). Hence it may be more informative to work on a scaled version of the welfare. For α ∈ ∆ K×S , define w(α) as:
Note that when n ∼ (n, α), we have: W (n) = nw(α) − n log(n). Now observe that x = (n, α ) if and only if α solves the following convex program:
subject to ∀k, s∈S k α ks = n k n , ∀s, α ks ≥ 0.
α represents the proportionally fair allocation of users to servers when the system size n is large. It will also turn useful to introduce a slightly different notion of social welfare: V (n) = k∈K n k log s∈S k n ks n k × µ ks n s . V (n) may be interpreted as the social welfare of a system where users of a given class fairly share the sum of the services rates of users of the same class. The following lemma relates the welfares W (n) and V (n) and states that these welfares coincide when they are maximized.
Lemma 4.1:
B. Efficiency of Nash Equilibriums
Pure NEs can be quite inefficient when the user population is small. For example, consider a system with two users and two servers, where users have a different preferred server (say user i has a greater service speed at server i, for i = 1, 2). It might well be that the allocation where both users are attached to their un-preferred server is a pure NE, which is indeed inefficient.
When the user population grows large, the allocations corresponding to pure NEs become more efficient, and get close to the ideal proportionally fair allocation. Our objective here is to quantify this observation precisely: we provide upper bounds on the difference between the social welfare achieved under the proportionally fair allocation and under pure NEs.
1) Average potential drift: We first establish a crucial result relating the average drift in the ordinal potential function ψ to the system welfare under the RLS algorithm. Let (t i ) i≥1 be the increasing sequence of epochs at which one user has the opportunity to switch servers under the RLS algorithm. This sequence is the superposition of n Poisson processes of intensity β, and hence corresponds to the instants of a Poisson process of intensity nβ. Theorem 4.1: For all i ≥ 1, the expected drift in the potential under RLS after the update taking place at time t i+1 satisfies:
2) Social Welfare in pure NEs: Assume that at time t i , the system has reached a pure NE. Then the subsequent average potential drifts vanish, i.e., E [ψ(n(t i+1 ) − ψ(n(t i ))|n(t i )] = 0.
As a consequence, from the previous theorem, we deduce that: 
V − V (n) ≤ S log eξ(n + S) .
(5) is obtained by combining (4) and the claim (i) of Lemma 4.1. To interpret Corollary 4.1, it is convenient to look at the scaled version of the social welfare. Let n ∼ (n, α) be a pure NE, then according to (4), we have: w(α ) − w(α) ≤ S n log eξ(n + S) . The above inequality implies that when the user population grows large, the allocation α of users to servers in a pure NE converges to the proportionally fair allocation α . The inequality also quantifies how fast this convergence occurs.
C. Convergence Rate
We are now interested in the system dynamics under the RLS and BR algorithms, and in particular, we wish to analyze the rate at which the system approaches pure NEs under these algorithms. To do so, we take a detour, and provide an upper bound of the difference between W and the welfare of the system at time t under one of these algorithms. In turn, in view of Corollary 4.1, this allows us to estimate the rate of convergence of RLS and BR when the user population is large. Let α(t) denote the fractions of users of various classes attached to the different servers at time t under the RLS algorithm, i.e., n(t) ∼ (n, α(t)). Applying Markov inequality, we deduce that for large systems (n → ∞), after time t, the system state has a scaled welfare within of w(α ) with probability at least 1 − δ as soon as t ≥ S log(ξS) δ . In particular, the convergence time towards the proportionally fair allocation does not depend on the user population.
Under the BR algorithm, the system converges typically more rapidly than under RLS, as stated in the following theorem (whose proof is omitted -it is similar to that of Theorem 4.2). Under the RLS algorithm, at time t i , the probability that a class-k user attached to server s has the opportunity to switch servers is n ks (t i )/n. The probability that the probed server is c ∈ S k is 1/S k ≥ 1/S where S k is the cardinality of S k . This user migrates to the new server only if µ kc n c (ti)+1 > µ ks n s (ti) .
Hence the expected drift in the ordinal potential satisfies: for any n ∈ N (n [1−K] ),
It remains to show that:
Let n ∈ N (n [1−K] ), and let n be a system state such that each server has one more users than in state n. Hence n = n + S, and for all s, n s = n s + 1. For all k and s, n ks ≤ n ks ≤ n ks + 1. Define δ = (δ ks = n ks − n ks ) k∈K,s∈S . Let N (n [1−K] ) the set of all possible states of a closed system starting from n . Define x = arg max x∈N R (n [1−K] ) W (x). We have:
where A = W − W (x ) and B = W (x ) − W (n ). From the definitions of W and W (x ),
where we used the concavity of W in the second inequality. Again, using the concavity of W , B satisfies:
Combining (7), (8) , and (9), we get (6).
B. Proof of Theorem 4.2
To prove the theorem, we first state and prove three preliminary lemmas. The first lemma provides an upper bound of the difference between the maximum and the minimal values of the ordinal potential function ψ over N (n [1−K] ).
Lemma 5.1: Let ψ max = max n∈N (n [1−K] ) ψ(n) and ψ min = min n∈N (n [1−K] ) ψ(n). Then:
Proof. We first provide a lower and an upper bound of s log(n s !). To this aim, we note that n! = Γ(n + 1) and use the convexity of log Γ(·). We have: We deduce that:
which concludes the proof. In the next lemma, we provide an upper bound of the minimum average gap between the maximum welfare W and the welfare after i ≤ I updates under the RLS algorithm.
Lemma 5.2: Let I ∈ N. We have:
· n log(Sξ) + S log eξ(n + S) .
Proof. From Theorem 4.1, we have:
By Lemma 5.1, ψ(n(t I+1 )) − ψ(n(0)) ≤ n log(Sξ). Thus,
E[ψ(n(t I+1 )) − ψ(n(0))] + S log(eξ(n + S)) ≤ nS I + 1 n log(Sξ) + S log(eξ(n + S)).
Our third lemma provides an upper bound of the evolution over time of the difference between the social welfare and the potential.
Lemma 5.3: For all i, let ∆ i = W (n(t i ))−ψ(n(t i )). Then for all i and j, |∆ i − ∆ j | ≤ S log n. Proof. By definition, W (n) − ψ(n) = s∈S log(n s !) − n s log(n s ) . We conclude that for all i and j, |∆ i − ∆ j | ≤ S log n.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.2. Let τ be the number of times users get an opportunity to switch servers up to time t under the RLS algorithm. From Lemma 5.2, given τ = I, there exists i ≤ I such that: E [W − W (n(t i * ))|τ = I] ≤ nS I + 1 · n log(Sξ) + S log(eξ(n + S)), and, by Lemma 5.3, for all i ≤ i ≤ I, W (n(t i )) ≥ W (n(t i )) + ψ(n(t i )) − ψ(n(t i )) − S log n.
Thus, E [W − W (n(t))|τ = I] ≤ E [W − W (n(t i * ))] − E [ψ(n(t i * )) − ψ(n(t i ))] + S log(n) 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the performance of the RLS algorithm, a very simple distributed load resampling strategy for heterogenous parallel server systems. In scenarios where the user population is fixed, we were able to quantify at any time the efficiency of the allocation of users to servers under this algorithm. Using this result, we may then investigate scenarios when users arrive and leave the system upon service completion, and analyse the stability of the system under the RLS algorithm.
